Finns det någon bok eller liknande på ämnet?
Så länge Molotov/Ribentropp pakten höll så pumpades ju rysk olja in i Tyskland. Men hur länge räckte den? Vilka oljefält hade tyskarna tillgång till under kriget? Rumänien, ok, men sen?
Bristen måste ha varit akut, annars hade de inte framställt den på syntetisk väg- vilket är svindyrt.
Någon som vet mer om det här?
Tysk brist på olja
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Gutekrigaren
- Medlem
- Inlägg: 4120
- Blev medlem: 23 mars 2002, 19:38
- Ort: Rom
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Halifírien
- Medlem
- Inlägg: 308
- Blev medlem: 8 mars 2004, 17:02
- Ort: Linköping
i Italien!?Halifírien skrev:I Italien fanns en del oljefält också. och i Ukraina, även om tyskarna inte kunde utnyttja dessa en särskilt lång period. Det var väl hursomhelst oljebristen som fick dem att gå mot Kaukasus och Stalingrad?
Italien hade ju akut brist på bränsle till flottan och flyg bla, så dom var tvungen att be Hitler om hjälp.
Vat låg dom någonstans?
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Mathias Forsberg
- Medlem
- Inlägg: 2986
- Blev medlem: 28 mars 2002, 15:09
- Ort: Stockholm
Nej. Utvinningen av olja inleddes inte förrän 1970-talet. Eventuella tyska oljeplattformar hade också varit omöjliga att driva utan att slås ut.Flink skrev:
Man tar upp olja i Nordsjön idag! Gjorde man det under kriget med?
I vilket fall som helst ligger de stora oljefälten närmare Norge och Skottland än den tyska Nordsjökusten.
/Forsberg
Är ganska säker på att han konstigt nog förväxlat Italien med Rumänien.Mille1 skrev:i Italien!?Halifírien skrev:I Italien fanns en del oljefält också. och i Ukraina, även om tyskarna inte kunde utnyttja dessa en särskilt lång period. Det var väl hursomhelst oljebristen som fick dem att gå mot Kaukasus och Stalingrad?
Italien hade ju akut brist på bränsle till flottan och flyg bla, så dom var tvungen att be Hitler om hjälp.
Vat låg dom någonstans?
Jocke. skrev:Är ganska säker på att han konstigt nog förväxlat Italien med Rumänien.Mille1 skrev:i Italien!?Halifírien skrev:I Italien fanns en del oljefält också. och i Ukraina, även om tyskarna inte kunde utnyttja dessa en särskilt lång period. Det var väl hursomhelst oljebristen som fick dem att gå mot Kaukasus och Stalingrad?
Italien hade ju akut brist på bränsle till flottan och flyg bla, så dom var tvungen att be Hitler om hjälp.
Vat låg dom någonstans?
Ja det var en annan femma.
Det lät lite konstigt
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Mathias Forsberg
- Medlem
- Inlägg: 2986
- Blev medlem: 28 mars 2002, 15:09
- Ort: Stockholm
För de hugade finns det bra läsning här
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airc ... becker.htm
Sidan går bl.a igenom produktion, import, behov och tillverkning av syntetiska bränslen.
Några utdrag:
In 1938, of the total consumption of 44 million barrels, imports from overseas accounted for 28 million barrels or roughly 60 percent of the total supply. An additional 3.8 million barrels were imported overland from European sources (2.8 million barrels came from Romania alone), and another 3.8 million barrels were derived from domestic oil production. The remainder of the total, 9 million barrels, were produced synthetically. Although the total overseas imports were even higher in 1939 before the onset of the blockade in September (33 million barrels), this high proportion of overseas imports only indicated how precarious the fuel situation would become should Germany be cut off from them.
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Even before the Russian prospects had come to naught, Romania had developed into Germany’s chief overland supplier of oil. From 2.8 million barrels in 1938, Romania’s exports to Germany increased to 13 million barrels by 1941,6 a level that was essentially maintained through 1942 and 1943
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Finally, the air raids on the Ploesti oil fields and refineries in August 1943 destroyed 50 percent of the Romanian refinery capacity. Aerial mining of the Danube River constituted an additional serious transportation impediment. Even so, Romanian deliveries amounted to 7 million barrels in the first half of 1944 and were not halted until additional raids on Ploesti had been flown in the late spring and summer of 1944
---
Still, between 1938 and 1943, synthetic fuel output underwent a respectable growth from 10 million barrels to 36 million. The percentage of synthetic fuels compared to the yield from all sources grew from 22 percent to more than 50 percent by 1943. The total oil supplies available from all sources for the same period rose from 45 million barrels in 1938 to 71 million barrels in 1943.
---
The first massive raid was flown on 12 May 1944 and directed against five plants. Other raids followed successively and continued into the spring of 1945. The severity of the raids was immediately recognized by the Germans. Between 30 June 1944 and 19 January 1945, Albert Speer directed five memoranda to Hitler which left no doubt about the increasingly serious situation. Speer pointed out that the attacks in May and June had reduced the output of aviation fuel by 90 percent. It would require six to eight weeks to make minimal repairs to resume production, but unless the refineries were protected by all possible means, coverage of the most urgent requirements of the armed forces could no longer be assured. An unbridgeable gap would be opened that must perforce have tragic consequences.32 Continued attacks also negatively influenced the output of automotive gasoline, diesel fuel, Buna, and methanol, the last an essential ingredient in the production of powder and explosives. If, Speer warned, the attacks were sustained, production would sink further, the last remaining reserve stocks would be consumed, and the essential materials for the prosecution of a modern technological war would be lacking in the most important areas.
MVH
Hans
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airc ... becker.htm
Sidan går bl.a igenom produktion, import, behov och tillverkning av syntetiska bränslen.
Några utdrag:
In 1938, of the total consumption of 44 million barrels, imports from overseas accounted for 28 million barrels or roughly 60 percent of the total supply. An additional 3.8 million barrels were imported overland from European sources (2.8 million barrels came from Romania alone), and another 3.8 million barrels were derived from domestic oil production. The remainder of the total, 9 million barrels, were produced synthetically. Although the total overseas imports were even higher in 1939 before the onset of the blockade in September (33 million barrels), this high proportion of overseas imports only indicated how precarious the fuel situation would become should Germany be cut off from them.
---
Even before the Russian prospects had come to naught, Romania had developed into Germany’s chief overland supplier of oil. From 2.8 million barrels in 1938, Romania’s exports to Germany increased to 13 million barrels by 1941,6 a level that was essentially maintained through 1942 and 1943
---
Finally, the air raids on the Ploesti oil fields and refineries in August 1943 destroyed 50 percent of the Romanian refinery capacity. Aerial mining of the Danube River constituted an additional serious transportation impediment. Even so, Romanian deliveries amounted to 7 million barrels in the first half of 1944 and were not halted until additional raids on Ploesti had been flown in the late spring and summer of 1944
---
Still, between 1938 and 1943, synthetic fuel output underwent a respectable growth from 10 million barrels to 36 million. The percentage of synthetic fuels compared to the yield from all sources grew from 22 percent to more than 50 percent by 1943. The total oil supplies available from all sources for the same period rose from 45 million barrels in 1938 to 71 million barrels in 1943.
---
The first massive raid was flown on 12 May 1944 and directed against five plants. Other raids followed successively and continued into the spring of 1945. The severity of the raids was immediately recognized by the Germans. Between 30 June 1944 and 19 January 1945, Albert Speer directed five memoranda to Hitler which left no doubt about the increasingly serious situation. Speer pointed out that the attacks in May and June had reduced the output of aviation fuel by 90 percent. It would require six to eight weeks to make minimal repairs to resume production, but unless the refineries were protected by all possible means, coverage of the most urgent requirements of the armed forces could no longer be assured. An unbridgeable gap would be opened that must perforce have tragic consequences.32 Continued attacks also negatively influenced the output of automotive gasoline, diesel fuel, Buna, and methanol, the last an essential ingredient in the production of powder and explosives. If, Speer warned, the attacks were sustained, production would sink further, the last remaining reserve stocks would be consumed, and the essential materials for the prosecution of a modern technological war would be lacking in the most important areas.
MVH
Hans