



Left: Thales (ADI) Submarine launched markers (visual distress signals) (see note 213). Right: a red flare (“pyrotechnic red”), also used by submarines as visual distress signal (see above and “Notice to Mariners”. Canadian Hydrographic Service (CHS), <http://www.notmar.gc.ca/eng/services/annual/annual-notices-to-mariners-eng.pdf>

²²⁶ Naval Research Laboratory (NRL 1998), 75th Anniversary: Awards for Innovation. Celebrating 75 Years of Science and Technology Development for the Navy, NRL 1923–1998, Washington, p. 47, http://www.nrl.navy.mil/content_images/75awards.pdf; see also <http://www.nrl.navy.mil/NewsRoom/images/75highlights.pdf>; US Navy Operation Specialist (NRTC September 2000, NAVEDTRA 14308), vol. 1. Ch. 13 (Search and Rescue); and Appendix 1 (References), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/navy/nrtc/14308_ch13.pdf; <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/navy/nrtc/14308.htm>; ‘Submarine Launched Markers’, http://www.thalesgroup.com/Countries/Australia/Documents/Submarine_Launched_Markers. About Soviet methods: see letter about methods used by submarines to attract attention in case of emergency (in Sweden, NATO and the Soviet Union) for Ambassador Ekéus’ Submarine Inquiry written by Commodore Bo Rask, Chief of First Submarine Flotilla, Swedish Royal Navy, 19 July 2001, The Ekéus Inquiry Files, National Archives, Stockholm. Above: Thales advertisement for submarine launched markers.

²²⁷ SOU 2001:85, pp. 123–125.

²²⁸ CMS WD (1982) and CMS Technical Reports 11-12 October 1982; Diary of the Chief of Defense, General Lennart Ljung, 12 October 1982, Military Archives, Stockholm. The hand-written version of Ljung’s diary says that the submarine was “possibly sunk”, while the later printed version changed this to the submarine was “possibly damaged”.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ *Belos* had not been able to use its divers or remotely operated video camera, because of the weather (CMS Technical Reports 11-12 October 1982). *Belos* was called back from Måsknöv/Mälsten before dawn (at 05:00 on 12 October, CÖriBO WD). There was no information on the objects, and Chief of Defense General Ljung was falsely informed.

²³¹ Tunander (2004), p. 78; CMS WD 11 October 1982.

²³² SOU 1995:135, p. 140. General Bengt Wallroth was the Secretary for the 1995 Commission and former Director of FRA. He congratulated me for having found this information in the report, but he told me they had not been able to identify the transmitters.

²³³ Tunander (2009), Chapter 4, p. 178-83; “Nyckeln till Hårsfjärden”, Uppdrag granskning, *Swedish TV 1*, 11 June 2008.

²³⁴ CÖriBO WD (1982) and CMS WD 10-11 October; Tunander (2004), p. 78.

²³⁵ According to Rolf Andersson and Thomas Kunze, Uppdrag granskning, *Swedish TV 1*, 11 June 2008.

²³⁶ Conversations with Rolf Andersson 2000-2015; Tunander (2009), Chapter 4, pp. 178-83; “Nyckeln ...”, Uppdrag granskning, *Swedish TV 1*, 11 June 2008.