Lite från Nürnberg-tribunalen om
Hitlers avsikter och planer angående Polen som han delgav Italiens utrikesminister greve Ciano under deras samtal den 12-13 augusti 1939 -- 11 dagar innan MR-pakten ens var född, innan man ens hade börjat samtala med sovjeterna på fullt allvar, innan Ribbentrop ens blev bjuden till Moskva.
När samtalet mellan Hitler och Ciano äger rum så är
"Fall Weiss" ("Fall Vit", den tyska anfallsplanen mot Polen) redan färdigställd. Det politiska beslutet att anfalla Polen tas redan i
början av 1939.
25 mars ger Hitler OKW:s Walther von Brauchitsch i uppdrag att skissa på en plan, vilken färdigställs den
3 april (startdatumet för ett anfall mot Polen sätts till senast den
1 september).
11 april godkänner Hitler denna "Fall Weiss", nu ska vapenslagen titta på den.
26-27 april lämnar de sina respektive betänkanden,
16 maj inkommer det sista (från Kriegmarine).
22 maj skriver Tyskland på
Stålpakten med Italien.
23 maj säger Hitler följande under ett möte med generalerna:
"Polen kommer alltid att vara på våra motståndares sida". Och dessutom (enligt Hitlers mening):
"Polen kan inte ens göra anspråk på att utgöra en barriär mot bolsjevismen. Således faller frågan om att skona Polen" - resumerade han.
"Kvarstår beslutet: att vid första lämpliga tillfälle anfalla Polen".
Redan här har alltså Hitler fattat sitt principiella beslut om att anfalla Polen.
15 juni spikas direktivet om den strategiska utplaceringen av marktrupperna.
22 juni presenteras ett preliminärt tidsschema för Hitler.
Den tyska
mobiliseringen startar redan i maj månad med att man gör stridsklara sex arméstyrelser, 11 armékårsstyrelser samt 24 divisioner.
Förmobiliseringen fortskrider sedan i Ost-Preussen i juli månad, en landsomfattande mobilisering sätts igång den
18 augusti.
Vid planeringen av
"Fall Weiss" betraktar tyskarna inte Sovjetunionen som något hot. Man räknar kallt med att Polen inte kommer att be sovjeterna om hjälp.
Enligt "Fall Weiss" räknar man också med att västmakterna inte kommer till Polens undsättning (dock kommer man aldrig till 100-procentig politisk klarhet om den saken). Om inte annat så skall man förekomma västmakterna genom att slå ut deras östliga allierade Polen genom ett snabbt anfall, innan de ens hinner reagera, för att sedan vända sig mot dem.
24 juli skriver Storbritannien och Japan på den s.k.
Craigie-Arita-deklarationen (enligt vilken britterna erkänner japanernas ansvar för säkerheten i Kina). Deklarationen demonstrerar tydligt för tyskarna att britterna inte är villiga att ingå avtal med Sovjetunionen -- Japan var ju som bekant Tysklands allierade och stred just då mot ryssarna vid
Chalchin-Gol.
För att ta reda på britternas och sovjeternas inställning till ett eventuellt tyskt krig mot Polen inleder nu tyskarna intensiva sonderingar åt båda håll.
2-3 augusti sonderar man aktivt Moskva,
7 augusti - London,
10 augusti - Moskva,
11 augusti - London,
14-15 augusti - Moskva.
21 augusti (samma dag som den fransk-brittiska delegationen fortfarande sitter i låtsasförhandlingar med ryssarna i Moskva -- utan erforderliga befogenheter om att ingå avtal med sovjeterna), föreslår tyskarna att britterna skall ta emot Göring för överläggningar i London den
24 augusti, och samtidigt att Ribbentrop skall tas emot i Moskva den
23 augusti.
22 augusti ger Hitler klartecken till att krig mot Polen skall inledas den
26 augusti. Görings flygtur till London ställs in i sista stund.
Av samtalet med greve Ciano den
12-13 augusti att döma verkar Hitler närmast
besatt av tanken på ett krig och ser ut att söka
minsta förevändning för att anfalla Polen så fort som möjligt, han har t.o.m. en bestämd uppfattning i sitt huvud om när detta skall ske --
senast i slutet av augusti (för september månad kan föra med sig lervälling på vägarna och dåligt väder som omöjliggör flygoperationer i Polen). Polackerna kan också ta Danzig i september, och då kan Tyskland inte göra någonting åt det (man kan inte bomba staden).
Avsikten (att i förlängningen anfalla västmakterna) framgår här med all tydlighet. Men innan dess måste deras östliga allierade, Polen, slås ut snabbt och bestämt, helst så hårt att Polen inte kan göra motstånd under de närmaste 50 åren.
En snabb likvidering av Polen är enligt Hitler nödvändig.
Nedan följer hela texten från Hitlers och Cianos samtal med talande partier markerade med fet text:
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tg ... 4-03.shtml
On 12th August and 13th August, when preparations were practically complete - and it will be remembered that they had to be complete for an invasion of Poland on 1st September - we find Hitler and the defendant Ribbentrop at last disclosing their intentions to their allies, the Italians.
In one of the passages in Hitler's speech of the 23rd May, it will be remembered - I will not quote it now because the document has been read before - however, in a passage in that speech Hitler, in regard to his proposed attack on Poland, had said, "Our object must be kept secret even from the Italians and the Japanese."
Now, when his preparations are complete, he discloses his intentions to his Italian comrades, and does so in hope that they will join him.
The minutes of that meeting are long, and it is not proposed to read more than a few passages. The meeting can be summarised generally by saying, as I have, that Hitler is trying to persuade the Italians to come into the war with him. The Italians, or Ciano, rather, is most surprised. He had no idea, as he says, of the urgency of the matter, and they are not prepared. He, therefore, is trying to dissuade Hitler from starting off until the Duce can have had a little more time to prepare himself.
The value - perhaps the greatest value - of the minutes of that meeting is that they show quite clearly the German intention to attack England and France ultimately, anyway, if not at the same time as Poland.
I refer the Tribunal to the second page of the exhibit. Hitler is trying to show the strength of Germany, the certainty of winning the war, and, therefore, he hopes to persuade the Italians to come in.
"At sea, England had for the moment no immediate reinforcements in prospect."
I quote from the top of the second page.
"Some time would elapse before any of the ships now under construction could be taken into service. As far as the land army was concerned, after the introduction of conscription 60,000 men had been called to the colours."
I quote this passage particularly to show the intention to attack England. We have been concentrating rather on Poland, but here his thoughts are turned entirely towards England.
"If England kept the necessary troops in her own country she could send to France, at the most, two infantry divisions and one armoured division. For the rest, she could supply a few bomber squadrons, but,
[Page 150]
hardly any fighters since, at the outbreak of war, the German Air Force would at once attack England and the English fighters would be urgently needed for the defence of their own country. With regard to the position of France, the Fuehrer said that in the event of a general war, after the destruction of Poland - which would not take long - Germany would be in a position to assemble hundreds of divisions along the West Wall, and France would then be compelled to concentrate all her available forces from the Colonies, from the Italian frontier and elsewhere, on her own Maginot Line, for the life and death struggle which would then ensue. The Fuehrer also thought that the French would find it no easier to overrun the Italian fortifications than to overrun the West Wall. Here Count Ciano showed signs of extreme doubt"
- doubt which, perhaps, in view of the subsequent performances, was well justified.
"The Polish Army was most uneven in quality. Together with a few parade divisions, there were large numbers of troops of less value. Poland was very weak in anti-tank and anti-aircraft defences and at the moment neither France nor England could help her in this respect."
What this Tribunal will appreciate, of course, is that Poland formed a threat to Germany on Germany's Eastern Frontier.
"If, however, Poland were given assistance by the Western Powers, over a longer period, she could obtain these weapons and German superiority would thereby be diminished. In contrast to the fanatics of Warsaw and Cracow, the population of their areas is different. Furthermore, it was necessary to consider the position of the Polish State. Out Of 34 million inhabitants, one and one-half million were German, about four million were Jews, and nine million Ukrainians, so that genuine Poles were much less in number than the total population, and as already said, their striking power was not to be valued highly. In these circumstances Poland could be struck to the ground by Germany in the shortest time.
Since the Poles, through their whole attitude, had made it clear that in any case, in the event of a conflict, they would stand on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, a quick liquidation at the present moment could only be of advantage for the unavoidable conflict with the Western Democracies. If a hostile Poland remained on Germany's Eastern frontier, not only would the eleven East Prussian divisions be tied down, but also further contingents would have to be kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This would not be necessary in the event of a previous liquidation."
The argument continues on those lines.
I pass on to the next page, at the top of the page:-
"Coming back to the Danzig question, the Fuehrer said that it was impossible for him now to go back. He had made an agreement with Italy for the withdrawal of the Germans from South Tyrol, but for this reason he must take the greatest care to avoid giving the impression that this Tyrolese withdrawal could be taken as a precedent for other areas. Furthermore, he had justified the withdrawal by pointing to a general Easterly and North-easterly direction of a German policy. The East and North-east, that is to say the Baltic countries, had been Germany's undisputed sphere of influence since time immemorial, as
[Page 151]
the Mediterranean had been the appropriate sphere for Italy. For economic reasons also, Germany needed the foodstuffs and timber from these Eastern regions."
Now we get the truth of this matter. It is not the persecution of German minorities on the Polish frontiers, but the economic reasons, the need for foodstuffs and timber from Poland.
"In the case of Danzig, German interests were not only material, although the city had the greatest harbour in the Baltic. Danzig was a Nuremberg of the North, an ancient German city awaking sentimental feelings for every German, and the Fuehrer was bound to take account of this psychological element in public opinion. To make a comparison with Italy, Count Ciano should imagine that Trieste was in Yugoslav hands and that a large Italian minority was being treated brutally on Yugoslav soil. It would be difficult to assume that Italy would long remain quiet over anything of this kind.
Count Ciano, in replying to the Fuehrer's statement, first expressed the great surprise on the Italian side over the completely unexpected seriousness of the position. Neither in the conversations in Milan nor in those which took place during his Berlin visit had there been any sign, from the German side, that the position with regard to Poland was so serious. On the contrary, Ribbentrop had said that in his opinion the Danzig question would be settled in the course of time. On these grounds, the Duce, in view of his conviction that a conflict with the Western Powers was unavoidable, had assumed that he should make his preparations for this event; he had made plans for a period of two or three years. If immediate conflict was unavoidable, the Duce, as he had told Ciano, would certainly stand on the German side, but for various reasons he would welcome the postponement of a general conflict until a later time."
No question of welcoming the cancellation of a general conflict; the only concern of anybody is as to time.
"Ciano then showed, with the aid of a map, the position of Italy in the event of a general war. Italy believed that a conflict with Poland would not be limited to that country but would develop into a general European war."
Thereafter, during the meeting, Ciano goes on to try to dissuade Hitter from any immediate action. I quote two lines from the argument at the top of Page 5 of the exhibit:
"For these reasons the Duce insisted that the Axis Powers should make a gesture which would reassure people of the peaceful intentions of Italy and Germany."
Then we get the Fuehrer's answer to those arguments, half- way down Page 5:-
"The Fuehrer answered that for a solution of the Polish problem no time should be lost; the nearer to the autumn one waited, the more difficult would military operations in Eastern Europe become. From the middle of September, weather conditions made air operations hardly possible in these areas, while the conditions of the roads, which were quickly turned into a morass by the autumn rains, would be such as to make them impossible for motorised forces. From September to May, Poland was a great marsh and entirely unsuited for any kind of military
[Page 152]
operations. Poland could, however, occupy Danzig in September, and Germany would not be able to do anything about it since they obviously could not bombard or destroy the place."
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tg ... 4-04.shtml
[LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GRIFFITH-JONES continues]
They could not possibly bombard or destroy any place where there happened to be Germans living. Warsaw, Rotterdam, England, London, - I wonder whether any sentiments of that kind were held in consideration in regard to those places.
"Ciano asked how soon, according to the Fuehrer's view, the Danzig question must be settled. The Fuehrer answered that this settlement must be made one way or another by the end of August. To the question of Ciano as to what solution the Fuehrer proposed, Hitler answered that Poland must give up political control of Danzig, but that Polish economic interests would obviously be preserved and that Polish general behaviour must contribute to a general lessening of the tension. He doubted whether Poland was ready to accept this solution since, up to the present, the German proposals had been refused. The Fuehrer had made this proposal personally to Beck, on his visit to Obersalzberg. They were extremely favourable to Poland. In return for the political surrender of Danzig, under a complete guarantee of Polish interests, and the establishment of a connection between East Prussia and the Reich, Germany would have given a frontier guarantee, a 25-year pact of friendship, and the participation of Poland in influence over Slovakia. Beck had received the proposal with the remark that he was willing to examine it. The plain refusal of it came only as a result of English intervention. The general Polish aims could be seen clearly from the Press. They wanted the whole of East Prussia, and even proposed to advance to Berlin."
That was something quite different.
The meeting was held over that night, and it continued on the following day.
It will be seen, on Page 7, in the middle of the page:-
"The Fuehrer had therefore come to two definite conclusions:-
(1) in the event of any further provocation, he would immediately attack;
(2) if Poland did not clearly and plainly state her political intention, she must be forced to do so."
I go to the last line on that page:-
"As matters now stand, Germany and Italy would simply not exist further in the world through the lack of space; not only was there no more space, but existing space was completely blockaded by its present possessors; they sat like misers with their heaps of gold, and deluded themselves about their riches. The Western Democracies were dominated by the desire to rule the world and would not regard Germany and Italy as their class. This psychological element of contempt was perhaps the worst thing about the whole business. It could only be settled by a life and death struggle, which the two Axis partners could meet more easily because their interests did not clash on any point.
The Mediterranean was obviously the most ancient domain for which Italy had a claim to predominance. The Duce himself had summed up the position to him in the words that Italy was already the dominant power in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the Fuehrer said that
[Page 153]
Germany must take the old German road Eastwards and that this road was also desirable for economic reasons, and that Italy had geographical and historical claims to permanency in the Mediterranean. Bismarck had recognised it and had said as much in his well-known letter to Manzini. The interests of Germany and Italy went in quite different directions and there never could be a conflict between them.
Ribbentrop added that if the two problems mentioned in yesterday's conversations were settled, Italy and Germany would have their backs free for work against the West. The Fuehrer said that Poland must be struck down so that for 50 years" - there appears to have been a query raised in the translation - "for so many years she would be incapable of fighting. In such a case, matters in the West could be settled.
Ciano thanked the Fuehrer for his extremely clear explanation of the situation. He had, on his side, nothing to add and would give the Duce full details. He asked for more definite information on one point, in order that the Duce might have all the facts before him. The Duce might indeed have to make no decision because the Fuehrer believed that the conflict with Poland could be localised on the basis of long experience. He - Ciano - quite saw that so far the Fuehrer had always been right in his judgement of the position. If, however, Mussolini had no decision to make, he had to take certain measures of precaution, and therefore Ciano would put the following questions.
The Fuehrer had mentioned two conditions under which he would take Poland (1) if Poland were guilty of serious provocation, and (2) if Poland did not make her political position clear. The first of these conditions depended on the decision of the Fuehrer, and German reaction could follow in a moment. The second condition required certain decisions as to time. Ciano therefore asked what was the date by which Poland must have satisfied Germany about her political condition. He realised that this date depended upon climatic conditions.
The Fuehrer answered that the decision of Poland must be made clear at the latest by the end of August. Since, however, the decisive part of military operations against Poland could be carried out within a period of 14 days, and the final liquidation would need only another four weeks, it could be finished at the end of September or the beginning of October. These could be regarded as the dates. It followed, therefore, that the last date on which he could begin to take action was the end of August.
Finally, the Fuehrer assured Ciano that since his youth he had favoured German-Italian co-operation, and that no other view was expressed in his books. He had always thought that Germany and Italy were naturally suited for collaboration, since there were no conflicts of interest between them. He was personally fortunate to live at a time in which, apart from himself, there was one other statesman who would stand out great and unique in history; that he could be this man's friend was for him a matter of great personal satisfaction, and if the hour of common battle struck he would always be found on the side of the Duce."
THE PRESIDENT: We might adjourn now for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
Med alla dessa händelser i bakhuvudet och med tanke på den krigsiver som Hitler uppvisar för Ciano i detta samtal, så är det närmast en lögn att påstå att Molotov-Ribbentroppakten fick Hitler att fatta beslutet om att anfalla Polen. Hitler stod i startgroparna för ett krig långt innan den pakten skrevs -- och planen var att
kriget skulle inledas i slutet av augusti, senast 1 september (som i "Fall Weiss"). Och som sagt,
redan den 23 maj 1939 fattade Hitler det principiella beslutet om att anfalla Polen.
Mythcracker
