Högsta krigsrådet eller supreme war council vilka styrde även om de formellt var underordnade Kejsar Hirohito.Löwe skrev:Vilka var de 6 stora?
Anami (armén)var krigsfraktionens främste medan Togo (utrikesminister) var fredsfraktionens.
Ingen bomb över Japan?
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Stefan Lundgren
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Martin Lundvall
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Jag laste detta i japan times for ett par veckor sedan. Tyckte det var intressant.
-Par
The Japan Times article The Japan Times article
Generals foiled Aug. 15 palace coup
Pair's actions credited with ensuring Hirohito surrender decree
By MUTSUO FUKUSHIMA
Kyodo News
Hours before Emperor Hirohito decreed Japan's World War II surrender 60 years ago, two Imperial army generals foiled a coup attempt by a dozen officers to block the historic broadcast.
News photo
Takeshi Mori (above) and Shizuichi Tanaka. PORTRAITS COURTESY OF KIN OF SHIZUICHI TANAKA AND TAKESHI MORI
News photo
On Aug. 15, 1945, nearly 1,000 soldiers occupied the Imperial Palace grounds for six hours from 2 a.m., aiming to seize two 25-cm records of the reading of the surrender decree and blocking its noon broadcast that day.
The actions of Lt. Gen. Takeshi Mori, commander of the First Imperial Guards Division, and Gen. Shizuichi Tanaka, commander of the Eastern Defense Command, enabled the monarch, known posthumously as Emperor Showa, to announce over the radio to the Japanese people and armed forces the nation's unconditional surrender.
The broadcast paved the way for the Allied Powers to occupy Japan without serious turmoil.
Emperor Hirohito made the recording at around 11:30 p.m. on Aug. 14, and Chamberlain Yoshihiro Tokugawa put the two records in a small safe in the first-floor office of the monarch's retinue, hidden from sight with piles of papers.
At around 1:40 a.m. on Aug. 15, Mori, 52, was shot by Maj. Kenji Hatanaka and then hacked to death by Capt. Shigetaro Uehara at his headquarters after rejecting their demand to order his 4,000-man division to revolt against the government and seize the palace.
"Mori rejected the officers' demands to order his Guards Division to rise up in revolt, because he had recognized the importance of establishing peace with the Allied Powers to prevent the Japanese people from being destroyed by a continued war," historian Kazutoshi Hando said in a recent interview.
"Had the broadcast of the surrender rescript been blocked, the Japanese military would have kept up its fighting spirit, and the armed forces would have carried on on many battlefields," he said.
On Aug. 14, the government of then Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki decided to accept the Allied demand for unconditional surrender. The decision was made at a meeting of the six-member Supreme Council for the Direction of the War, including Suzuki and War Minister Korechika Anami, in the presence of Emperor Hirohito.
At around 2 a.m. the next morning, Maj. Hidemasa Koga, Guards Division staff officer and son-in-law of Gen. Hideki Tojo, the prime minister at the time of the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack, issued a bogus order for the 1,000 soldiers to occupy the palace, seize all gates and cut all telephone lines except one linking the palace to the Guards headquarters.
The order was aimed at isolating the Emperor from the outside, preventing him from asking the government or any forces inclined toward peace, including the Eastern Defense Command, for help, and toppling the Suzuki administration to form a new government led by War Minister Anami.
The Eastern Command, led by Gen. Tanaka, was in charge of defending the capital.
The coup leaders affixed the official seal of murdered Division Commander Mori to copies of the order, tricking the division's field and company officers into believing it was authentic.
In addition, a 60-man company of the Guards Division's First Regiment occupied NHK, then based in Tokyo's Uchisaiwaicho, and prohibited all broadcasts. NHK was then 1.5 km away from the Imperial Household Ministry, the predecessor of the Imperial Household Agency.
"I heard three bangs when I was on sentry duty in an air-raid shelter outside the room of Division Commander Mori," said Ikuo Okazawa, who was a 24-year-old lance corporal in the division's Second Regiment at the time of the assassination.
Okazawa, now 84, claimed he initially thought the three bangs might have come from a motorcycle being started nearby.
Shortly after the shots, 2nd Lt. Tamiharu Sasaki came to the shelter and ordered Okazawa and three other soldiers to make "a pair of wooden boxes large enough for a person," as well as lids.
"We went to a nearby First Regiment barracks, and tore up the floorboards to make the boxes," Okazawa, a former legislator of the town assembly of Kamigori, Hyogo Prefecture, said in a recent interview.
An hour later, Okazawa and the others took the rough-planed coffins to the commander's room.
Then, "2nd Lt. Sasaki, loosening his sword, told us he would hack us to death if we said anything to anybody about what we were going to see upon entering the room," he said.
"When I entered the room, I found the bodies of Mori and his brother-in-law, Lt. Col. (Michinori) Shiraishi," he said. It was only at that moment that he realized the boxes he had made were coffins, he reckoned.
Shiraishi, staff officer of the Hiroshima-based Second General Army, had come to Tokyo the previous day and called on Mori, his wife's older brother, before he was to fly back to Hiroshima.
"My estimate is that the number of soldiers who entered the palace premises was more than 1,000. . . . Those who invaded the Imperial Household Ministry building to seize the recordings of the rescript numbered between 40 and 50," Masahisa Enai, a former corporal in the Imperial Guards Division's Second Regiment and a coup participant, said in a telephone interview.
Enai, 88, became an Asahi Shimbun journalist after the war.
At the Aug. 14 supreme council meeting, Hirohito asked the councilors to prepare the capitulation decree.
"If we continue the war, Japan will be totally annihilated. If even a small number of Japanese people's seed is allowed to remain . . . there is a glimmer of hope of an eventual Japanese recovery. . . . I am willing to go before the microphone," he said.
In the subsequently recorded announcement, he said: "I have ordered the government to communicate to the governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that our empire accepts the provisions of their joint declaration" issued from Potsdam near Berlin on July 26.
However, despite a series of military defeats in the Pacific, including in the Philippines and Okinawa, the Aug. 6 atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Aug. 9 bombing of Nagasaki, and even Japan's dispatch of a cablegram on Aug. 10 accepting the Potsdam declaration, there were still plenty of military fanatics who refused to surrender.
Masataka Ida, a coup leader, said in a 380-page memoir that he tried to persuade Mori to order his Guards Division to occupy the palace at a meeting that began at around 12:40 a.m. on Aug. 15.
"Your excellency, if we obey the Emperor's order, the emperor system could be abolished. . . . A plan has been devised to kill you, though it depends on your response," Ida told Mori.
The lieutenant colonel quoted Mori as responding: "I am prepared for the worst. I am risking my life to defend the palace."
Just after Ida left Mori's room, Maj. Hatanaka and Capt. Uehara entered and learned Mori had rejected their demand that he order the coup. Then they killed him.
Capt. Nobuo Kitabatake, commander of one of the three Guards Division battalions that took over the palace, wrote in his memoir: "If the Imperial Guards Division became the first to rise in revolt, it would embolden the entire military to rise, thus leading Japan to continue the war."
After the forged order to gain control of the palace was issued at around 2 a.m., Koga and Hatanaka entered the palace, tricking Col. Toyojiro Haga, commander of the 1,000 Imperial Guards on the grounds, into believing the war minister would soon call on the Emperor to persuade him to scrap his decision to surrender.
The soldiers started searching for the surrender records. Capt. Kiichiro Aiura, a leader of a machinegun company with the Imperial Guards Second Regiment, was one of the officers ordered to join the search.
"I was ordered by Maj. Koga to go to the Imperial Household Ministry building and search for the records of the (surrender decree) along with Capt. Shinichi Kitamura, who had already been looking," he said.
The rebels searched for the recording for 90 minutes, but to no avail.
The plotters suffered a setback when Col. Kazuo Mizutani, chief of staff of the Guards Division, escaped to the Eastern Defense Command and alerted Gen. Tanaka.
At 4 a.m., Tanaka arrived at the barracks of the Imperial Guards Division and persuaded Col. Taro Watanabe, commander of its First Regiment, who was on the brink of sending 1,000 reinforcements to the palace, to disperse his soldiers.
Tanaka then summoned Haga, informed him that Mori had been murdered and that the occupation order was a sham, and persuaded him to order his troops to stand down.
After a furious Haga confronted Koga and Hatanaka, they left the palace and killed themselves. Haga had all of the troops pulled out of the palace at around 8 a.m.
At noon, the surrender recording was broadcast, and the nation heard the Emperor's voice announcing Japan's capitulation.
Brig. Gen. Bonner Fellers, an adviser to Gen. Douglas MacArthur, wrote in 1947 of the broadcast, "This historically unprecedented surrender unquestionably shortened the war by many months and prevented an estimated 450,000 American battle casualties."
-Par
The Japan Times article The Japan Times article
Generals foiled Aug. 15 palace coup
Pair's actions credited with ensuring Hirohito surrender decree
By MUTSUO FUKUSHIMA
Kyodo News
Hours before Emperor Hirohito decreed Japan's World War II surrender 60 years ago, two Imperial army generals foiled a coup attempt by a dozen officers to block the historic broadcast.
News photo
Takeshi Mori (above) and Shizuichi Tanaka. PORTRAITS COURTESY OF KIN OF SHIZUICHI TANAKA AND TAKESHI MORI
News photo
On Aug. 15, 1945, nearly 1,000 soldiers occupied the Imperial Palace grounds for six hours from 2 a.m., aiming to seize two 25-cm records of the reading of the surrender decree and blocking its noon broadcast that day.
The actions of Lt. Gen. Takeshi Mori, commander of the First Imperial Guards Division, and Gen. Shizuichi Tanaka, commander of the Eastern Defense Command, enabled the monarch, known posthumously as Emperor Showa, to announce over the radio to the Japanese people and armed forces the nation's unconditional surrender.
The broadcast paved the way for the Allied Powers to occupy Japan without serious turmoil.
Emperor Hirohito made the recording at around 11:30 p.m. on Aug. 14, and Chamberlain Yoshihiro Tokugawa put the two records in a small safe in the first-floor office of the monarch's retinue, hidden from sight with piles of papers.
At around 1:40 a.m. on Aug. 15, Mori, 52, was shot by Maj. Kenji Hatanaka and then hacked to death by Capt. Shigetaro Uehara at his headquarters after rejecting their demand to order his 4,000-man division to revolt against the government and seize the palace.
"Mori rejected the officers' demands to order his Guards Division to rise up in revolt, because he had recognized the importance of establishing peace with the Allied Powers to prevent the Japanese people from being destroyed by a continued war," historian Kazutoshi Hando said in a recent interview.
"Had the broadcast of the surrender rescript been blocked, the Japanese military would have kept up its fighting spirit, and the armed forces would have carried on on many battlefields," he said.
On Aug. 14, the government of then Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki decided to accept the Allied demand for unconditional surrender. The decision was made at a meeting of the six-member Supreme Council for the Direction of the War, including Suzuki and War Minister Korechika Anami, in the presence of Emperor Hirohito.
At around 2 a.m. the next morning, Maj. Hidemasa Koga, Guards Division staff officer and son-in-law of Gen. Hideki Tojo, the prime minister at the time of the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack, issued a bogus order for the 1,000 soldiers to occupy the palace, seize all gates and cut all telephone lines except one linking the palace to the Guards headquarters.
The order was aimed at isolating the Emperor from the outside, preventing him from asking the government or any forces inclined toward peace, including the Eastern Defense Command, for help, and toppling the Suzuki administration to form a new government led by War Minister Anami.
The Eastern Command, led by Gen. Tanaka, was in charge of defending the capital.
The coup leaders affixed the official seal of murdered Division Commander Mori to copies of the order, tricking the division's field and company officers into believing it was authentic.
In addition, a 60-man company of the Guards Division's First Regiment occupied NHK, then based in Tokyo's Uchisaiwaicho, and prohibited all broadcasts. NHK was then 1.5 km away from the Imperial Household Ministry, the predecessor of the Imperial Household Agency.
"I heard three bangs when I was on sentry duty in an air-raid shelter outside the room of Division Commander Mori," said Ikuo Okazawa, who was a 24-year-old lance corporal in the division's Second Regiment at the time of the assassination.
Okazawa, now 84, claimed he initially thought the three bangs might have come from a motorcycle being started nearby.
Shortly after the shots, 2nd Lt. Tamiharu Sasaki came to the shelter and ordered Okazawa and three other soldiers to make "a pair of wooden boxes large enough for a person," as well as lids.
"We went to a nearby First Regiment barracks, and tore up the floorboards to make the boxes," Okazawa, a former legislator of the town assembly of Kamigori, Hyogo Prefecture, said in a recent interview.
An hour later, Okazawa and the others took the rough-planed coffins to the commander's room.
Then, "2nd Lt. Sasaki, loosening his sword, told us he would hack us to death if we said anything to anybody about what we were going to see upon entering the room," he said.
"When I entered the room, I found the bodies of Mori and his brother-in-law, Lt. Col. (Michinori) Shiraishi," he said. It was only at that moment that he realized the boxes he had made were coffins, he reckoned.
Shiraishi, staff officer of the Hiroshima-based Second General Army, had come to Tokyo the previous day and called on Mori, his wife's older brother, before he was to fly back to Hiroshima.
"My estimate is that the number of soldiers who entered the palace premises was more than 1,000. . . . Those who invaded the Imperial Household Ministry building to seize the recordings of the rescript numbered between 40 and 50," Masahisa Enai, a former corporal in the Imperial Guards Division's Second Regiment and a coup participant, said in a telephone interview.
Enai, 88, became an Asahi Shimbun journalist after the war.
At the Aug. 14 supreme council meeting, Hirohito asked the councilors to prepare the capitulation decree.
"If we continue the war, Japan will be totally annihilated. If even a small number of Japanese people's seed is allowed to remain . . . there is a glimmer of hope of an eventual Japanese recovery. . . . I am willing to go before the microphone," he said.
In the subsequently recorded announcement, he said: "I have ordered the government to communicate to the governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that our empire accepts the provisions of their joint declaration" issued from Potsdam near Berlin on July 26.
However, despite a series of military defeats in the Pacific, including in the Philippines and Okinawa, the Aug. 6 atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Aug. 9 bombing of Nagasaki, and even Japan's dispatch of a cablegram on Aug. 10 accepting the Potsdam declaration, there were still plenty of military fanatics who refused to surrender.
Masataka Ida, a coup leader, said in a 380-page memoir that he tried to persuade Mori to order his Guards Division to occupy the palace at a meeting that began at around 12:40 a.m. on Aug. 15.
"Your excellency, if we obey the Emperor's order, the emperor system could be abolished. . . . A plan has been devised to kill you, though it depends on your response," Ida told Mori.
The lieutenant colonel quoted Mori as responding: "I am prepared for the worst. I am risking my life to defend the palace."
Just after Ida left Mori's room, Maj. Hatanaka and Capt. Uehara entered and learned Mori had rejected their demand that he order the coup. Then they killed him.
Capt. Nobuo Kitabatake, commander of one of the three Guards Division battalions that took over the palace, wrote in his memoir: "If the Imperial Guards Division became the first to rise in revolt, it would embolden the entire military to rise, thus leading Japan to continue the war."
After the forged order to gain control of the palace was issued at around 2 a.m., Koga and Hatanaka entered the palace, tricking Col. Toyojiro Haga, commander of the 1,000 Imperial Guards on the grounds, into believing the war minister would soon call on the Emperor to persuade him to scrap his decision to surrender.
The soldiers started searching for the surrender records. Capt. Kiichiro Aiura, a leader of a machinegun company with the Imperial Guards Second Regiment, was one of the officers ordered to join the search.
"I was ordered by Maj. Koga to go to the Imperial Household Ministry building and search for the records of the (surrender decree) along with Capt. Shinichi Kitamura, who had already been looking," he said.
The rebels searched for the recording for 90 minutes, but to no avail.
The plotters suffered a setback when Col. Kazuo Mizutani, chief of staff of the Guards Division, escaped to the Eastern Defense Command and alerted Gen. Tanaka.
At 4 a.m., Tanaka arrived at the barracks of the Imperial Guards Division and persuaded Col. Taro Watanabe, commander of its First Regiment, who was on the brink of sending 1,000 reinforcements to the palace, to disperse his soldiers.
Tanaka then summoned Haga, informed him that Mori had been murdered and that the occupation order was a sham, and persuaded him to order his troops to stand down.
After a furious Haga confronted Koga and Hatanaka, they left the palace and killed themselves. Haga had all of the troops pulled out of the palace at around 8 a.m.
At noon, the surrender recording was broadcast, and the nation heard the Emperor's voice announcing Japan's capitulation.
Brig. Gen. Bonner Fellers, an adviser to Gen. Douglas MacArthur, wrote in 1947 of the broadcast, "This historically unprecedented surrender unquestionably shortened the war by many months and prevented an estimated 450,000 American battle casualties."
En intressant artikel angående både A-Bomben och Olympic.
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/P ... l.asp?pg=1
Diplomati
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/P ... l.asp?pg=1
Diplomati
An inner cabinet in Tokyo authorized Japan's only officially sanctioned diplomatic initiative. The Japanese dubbed this inner cabinet the Big Six because it comprised just six men: Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, Army Minister Korechika Anami, Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai, and the chiefs of staff of the Imperial Army (General Yoshijiro Umezu) and Imperial Navy (Admiral Soemu Toyoda). In complete secrecy, the Big Six agreed on an approach to the Soviet Union in June 1945. This was not to ask the Soviets to deliver a "We surrender" note; rather, it aimed to enlist the Soviets as mediators to negotiate an end to the war satisfactory to the Big Six--in other words, a peace on terms satisfactory to the dominant militarists. Their minimal goal was not confined to guaranteed retention of the Imperial Institution; they also insisted on preservation of the old militaristic order in Japan, the one in which they ruled.
Olympic?There are a good many more points that now extend our understanding beyond the debates of 1995. But it is clear that all three of the critics' central premises are wrong. The Japanese did not see their situation as catastrophically hopeless. They were not seeking to surrender, but pursuing a negotiated end to the war that preserved the old order in Japan, not just a figurehead emperor. Finally, thanks to radio intelligence, American leaders, far from knowing that peace was at hand, understood--as one analytical piece in the "Magic" Far East Summary stated in July 1945, after a review of both the military and diplomatic intercepts--that "until the Japanese leaders realize that an invasion can not be repelled, there is little likelihood that they will accept any peace terms satisfactory to the Allies." This cannot be improved upon as a succinct and accurate summary of the military and diplomatic realities of the summer of 1945.
Ett annat perspektivFrom mid-July onwards, Ultra intercepts exposed a huge military buildup on Kyushu. Japanese ground forces exceeded prior estimates by a factor of four. Instead of 3 Japanese field divisions deployed in southern Kyushu to meet the 9 U.S. divisions, there were 10 Imperial Army divisions plus additional brigades. Japanese air forces exceeded prior estimates by a factor of two to four. Instead of 2,500 to 3,000 Japanese aircraft, estimates varied between about 6,000 and 10,000. One intelligence officer commented that the Japanese defenses threatened "to grow to [the] point where we attack on a ratio of one (1) to one (1) which is not the recipe for victory
This brings us to another aspect of history that now very belatedly has entered the controversy. Several American historians led by Robert Newman have insisted vigorously that any assessment of the end of the Pacific war must include the horrifying consequences of each continued day of the war for the Asian populations trapped within Japan's conquests. Newman calculates that between a quarter million and 400,000 Asians, overwhelmingly noncombatants, were dying each month the war continued. Newman et al. challenge whether an assessment of Truman's decision can highlight only the deaths of noncombatant civilians in the aggressor nation while ignoring much larger death tolls among noncombatant civilians in the victim nations.
Re: Ingen bomb över Japan?
Var det den som visades i Pearl Harbour? Där flygbombar de delar av Tokyo. Vill minnas att Alec Baldwins karaktär hette Dolittle...Armfeldt skrev: Det som också bidrog till Japans nederlag var Doolitle-räden den 9 mars 1945 då 185 000 människor i Tokyo miste livet. Förödelsen blev mycket större än de två atombomberna tillsammans.
Re: Ingen bomb över Japan?
Det klargörs iofs tidigare i trådenCarolus skrev:Var det den som visades i Pearl Harbour? Där flygbombar de delar av Tokyo. Vill minnas att Alec Baldwins karaktär hette Dolittle...Armfeldt skrev: Det som också bidrog till Japans nederlag var Doolitle-räden den 9 mars 1945 då 185 000 människor i Tokyo miste livet. Förödelsen blev mycket större än de två atombomberna tillsammans.
men Dolittle genomfördes 1942 och var mest en symbolisk attack som i huvudsak skadade japansk moral (och förbättrade amerikansk).Räden mot Tokyo
Stämmer det att över 185 000 människor fick sätta livet till vid den räden?
Ju ´värre´ än Hamburg och Dresden...
Stämmer uppgifterna?
mvh/Björn
Ju ´värre´ än Hamburg och Dresden...
Stämmer uppgifterna?
mvh/Björn
Re: Räden mot Tokyo
Exakta siffror är alltid svårt och 185 000+ är sannolkt i överkant.Confident skrev:Stämmer det att över 185 000 människor fick sätta livet till vid den räden?
Ju ´värre´ än Hamburg och Dresden...
Stämmer uppgifterna?
mvh/Björn
Jag tror mig läst en japansk räkning hamnade på ca 85 000 men det är sannolikt ett minimum.
Re: Räden mot Tokyo
A torch to the ennemy av Martin Caidin.
Mycket bra fast otäck bok, där sägs att det rörde sig om uppemot 250 000 människor dödade! Han har pratat med många överlevande. Den utgåvan jag har är tryckt 1961.
USAF Handbook 1939-1945 av Martin W. Bowman
Säger att 185 000 blev dödade och skadade - lite vagt kanske. Bara någon halvsida om räden. Tryckt 1997.
MVH
Hans
Mycket bra fast otäck bok, där sägs att det rörde sig om uppemot 250 000 människor dödade! Han har pratat med många överlevande. Den utgåvan jag har är tryckt 1961.
USAF Handbook 1939-1945 av Martin W. Bowman
Säger att 185 000 blev dödade och skadade - lite vagt kanske. Bara någon halvsida om räden. Tryckt 1997.
MVH
Hans
Re: Räden mot Tokyo
Bara så inga fortsatt missförstånd uppstår, jag pratar om den B29 räden den 9-10 mars 1945. Inte Dolittleräden med B25'or 1942.
MVH
Hans
MVH
Hans